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A.	  	  Introduction	  
 
Viewed	  at	  a	  certain	  angle,	   the	  rogue	  state	  seems	  to	  be	   in	  almost	  necessary	  relation	  with	  
the	  idea	  of	  rupture.	  	  As	  Derrida	  put	  it	  in	  his	  2002	  lectures	  on	  Rogues,	  the	  rogue	  state,	  état	  
voyou	  in	  ‘franglaise,’1	  “is	  someone	  who	  rattles,	  who	  shakes	  things	  up,	  who	  agitates.”2	  	  Past	  
and	   present	   rogue	   states	   like	   Iran,	   Iraq,	   Libya	   or	   North	   Korea,	   are	   associated	   with	   the	  
acquisition	   of	  Weapons	   of	  Mass	  Destruction	   (WMD),	   state	   sponsorship	   of	   terrorism	   and	  
the	  violation	  of	  human	  rights.	  These	  entities	  pose	  both	  external	  threats	  to	  other	  states	  and	  
internal	  threats	  to	  their	  own	  people.	  Today,	  the	  phrase	  ‘rogue	  state’	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  past	  
its	  sell-­‐by-­‐date.	  While	  the	  term	  was	  not	  coined	  by	  the	  G.W.	  Bush	  administration,	  during	  the	  
eight	   years	   it	   was	   in	   power	   in	   the	   United	   States	   (US),	   the	   phrase	   became	   strongly	  
associated	   with	   the	   Bush	   Doctrine,	   appearing	   in	   key	   security	   documents	   as	   well	   as	  
speeches.3	   	  Under	  the	  banner	  of	   ‘change’	  President	  Obama,	  a	  Nobel	  Peace	  Laureate,	  has	  
distanced	  himself	  from	  the	  policies	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  The	  phrase	  ‘rogue	  state’	  has	  been	  
expunged	  from	  the	  current	  National	  Security	  Strategy,	  for	  instance.4	  	  
	  
This	  paper	  will	   suggest	   that	   the	  Obama	  administration	  might	   find	   it	  difficult	   to	  get	   rid	  of	  
the	  concept	  of	  the	  rogue	  state.	  The	  rogue	  state	  is	  too	  useful	  a	  category,	  and	  too	  integral	  to	  
the	  Administration’s	  tactic	  of	  ‘isolation,’	  to	  be	  easily	  sidelined.	  The	  isolation	  of	  rogue	  states	  
has	  echoes	  of	  the	  exclusion	  of	  criminals	  in	  national	  legal	  systems;	  as	  Zygmunt	  Bauman	  has	  
explained,	  societies	  exclude	  those	  who	  deviate	  from	  the	  norms	  that	  constitute	  the	  system	  
of	  order	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  they	  are	  “unfit	  to	  be	  free	  agents.”5	  Such	  unfitness	  can	  be	  used	  
to	  legitimate	  different	  treatment	  and	  unequal	  status.	  At	  the	  international	  level,	  the	  rogue	  
state	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘unequal	  sovereign’6	  —	  the	  criminal	  state.	  The	  criminal	  is	  one	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who	   violates	   norms	   of	   order.	   	   The	   rogue	   state	   fits	   into	   this	   mould;	   as	   Derrida	   wrote,	  
voyoucracy	  stands	  for	  disorder.7	  
	  
The	  rogue	  state,	  as	  a	  criminal	  state,	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  violations	  of	  international	  obligations.	  
International	   law	  norms	  and	  institutions	  play	  a	  further	  role	  in	  dealing	  with	  such	  states	  by	  
restoring	   order,	   either	   by	   excluding	   them	   from	   the	   international	   community	   or	   by	  
enforcing	   their	   compliance	  with	   international	   obligations.	   	   As	   an	   idea	   incompatible	  with	  
the	  doctrine	  of	   sovereign	  equality,	   the	   concept	  of	   the	   criminal	   state	   is	   controversial	   and	  
incompatible	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  Charter	  commitment	  to	  respect	  the	  sovereign	  
equality	  of	  its	  members.8	  It	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  generally	  accepted	  by	  states	  unless	  criminality	  
is	   equated	   with	   an	   extreme	   form	   of	   deviance.	   The	   rogue	   state,	   an	   already	   established	  
category	  of	  deviance,	  is	  a	  relatively	  uncontroversial	  target	  for	  criminalization.	  	  	  
	  
	  
B.	  	  What	  is	  a	  Rogue	  State?	  
	  
There	   have	   been	   various	   attempts	   to	   define	   the	   term	   rogue	   state.	   Gerry	   Simpson	   has	  
distinguished	  two	  sorts	  of	  outlaw	  states;	  criminal	  ones	  and	  illiberal	  ones.9	  It	  could	  be	  said	  
that	  for	  criminal	  states,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  their	  external	  relations	  with	  other	  states,	  while	  for	  
illiberal	   ones,	   more	   emphasis	   is	   put	   on	   the	   internal	   relationship	   between	   regime	   and	  
people.	   Rogue	   states,	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   outlaw	   state,	   encompass	   both	   elements.	   Some	  
definitions	   focus	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  material	   threats	  to	   international	  peace	  and	  security	  that	  
emanate	  from	  rogue	  states;	  ‘criminal’	  outlaws.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  said	  that	  rogue	  states	  are	  
those	  that	  sponsor	  international	  terrorism	  or	  proliferate	  WMD.10	  The	  problem	  with	  such	  a	  
definition	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  account	  for	  why	  states	  such	  as	  India	  or	  Israel	  –	  both	  of	  which	  
are	  widely	  believed	  to	  have	  violated	  the	  norm	  against	  proliferation	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  –	  
are	  absent	  from	  roll	  calls	  of	  rogue	  states.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  mere	  capability	  
to	  explain	  rogue	  status,	  an	  additional	  element	  of	  (nefarious)	  intention	  has	  sometimes	  been	  
grafted	  on.11	  
	  
Other	  definitions	  are	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  internal	  manifestations	  of	  rogue	  statehood;	  
‘illiberal’	  outlaws.	  	  For	  instance,	  they	  define	  rogue	  states	  as	  those	  that	  abuse	  human	  rights	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and	  fail	  to	  respect	  democracy.12	  John	  Yoo	  wrote	  that	  the	  US	  definition	  of	  rogue	  state	  had	  
two	   prongs:	   “[H]uman	   rights	   abuses	   and	   dangerous	   ideological	   regimes.”13	   The	   problem	  
with	   the	   emphasis	   on	   such	   internal	   policies	   is	   that	   there	   are	   several	   states	   popularly	  
associated	  with	  human	  rights	  abuses	  that	  are	  not	  usually	  included	  in	  the	  category	  of	  rogue	  
state:	   	   Burma	   is	   one	   example.14	   The	   National	   Security	   Strategy	   of	   the	   G.W.	   Bush	  
Administration	  combined	  these	  external	  and	  internal	  elements.	  That	  document	  listed	  five	  
features	  of	  the	  rogue	  state,	  which	  are	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Rogue	  states	  
• brutalize	   their	   own	   people	   and	   squander	   their	   national	   resources	  
for	  the	  personal	  gain	  of	  the	  rulers;	  
• display	   no	   regard	   for	   international	   law,	   threaten	   their	   neighbors,	  
and	  callously	  violate	  international	  treaties	  to	  which	  they	  are	  party;	  
• are	  determined	  to	  acquire	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction,	  along	  with	  
other	   advanced	   military	   technology,	   to	   be	   used	   as	   threats	   or	  
offensively	  to	  achieve	  the	  aggressive	  designs	  of	  these	  regimes;	  
• sponsor	  terrorism	  around	  the	  globe;	  and	  	  
• reject	   basic	   human	   values	   and	   hate	   the	   United	   States	   and	  
everything	  for	  which	  it	  stands.15	  
	  
This	   comprehensive	   litany	   of	   the	   failings	   of	   rogue	   states	   underlines	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	  
them	   to	   international	   order,	   understood	   broadly	   in	   terms	   of	   peace	   and	   security,	  
international	   law	   and	   liberal	   values.	  Whether	   criminal,	   illiberal	   or	   both,	   rogue	   states	   are	  
identified	  by	  their	  Otherness:	  	  not	  only	  do	  they	  not	  share	  the	  values	  or	  identity	  of	  ‘normal’	  
states,	  but	   they	   violently	  oppose	   them.	  Madeline	  Albright	   said	   rogue	   states	  are	   the	  kind	  
that	  “not	  only	  do	  not	  have	  a	  part	   in	   the	   international	  system,	  but	  whose	   [sic]	  very	  being	  
involves	  being	  outside	  of	   it	   [sic]	   and	   throwing,	   literally,	  hand	  grenades	   inside	   in	  order	   to	  
destroy	  it.”16	  The	  rogue	  state	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  public	  enemy:	  	  it	  does	  not	  offer	  an	  alternative	  sort	  
of	   order,	   but	   only	   disorder.17	   Unlike	   the	   US	   and	   its	   allies	   who	   are	   “on	   the	   right	   side	   of	  
history,”18	  the	  rogue	  state	  is	  “on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  history.”19	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The	   Otherness	   connected	   with	   the	   term	   rogue	   state	   means	   that	   it	   operates	   as	   a	   label	  
rather	  than	  as	  an	  analytical	  category.20	  As	  a	  label,	  it	  is	  supposed	  to	  help	  mobilize	  domestic	  
and	   international	   support	   for	   action	   against	   states	   so	   labeled.21	   Indeed,	   although	   it	   has	  
been	   more	   than	   once	   suggested	   that	   the	   rogue	   state	   label	   was	   anathema	   to	   the	   US’s	  
potential	  allies	  in	  Europe,22	  the	  experience	  of	  last	  decade	  suggests	  that	  the	  concept	  –	  if	  not	  
the	   label	   –	   has	   had	   a	   mobilizing	   effect.	   The	   label	   ‘rogue	   state’	   also	   has	   an	   important	  
negative	  effect:	  	  By	  casting	  a	  state	  as	  Other,	  states	  which	  view	  themselves	  as	  members	  of	  
the	  international	  community	  do	  not	  identify	  with	  it	  and	  are	  therefore	  less	  likely	  to	  object	  
to	   the	   undermining	   of	   the	   rogue	   state’s	   sovereignty.	   	   For	   instance,	   it	   can	   enable	   action	  
against	   sovereign	   states	   that	   would	   otherwise	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   unjustified	   intervention	   in	  
their	  domestic	  sphere.23	  
	  
This	   connects	   with	   another	   sort	   of	   understanding	   of	   the	   rogue	   state	   that	   pertains	   to	  
international	   law	  as	  the	   law	  of	  the	   international	  community.	  Derrida	  described	  the	  rogue	  
state	  in	  this	  way:	  	  it	  is	  “a	  state	  that	  respects	  neither	  its	  obligations	  as	  a	  state	  before	  the	  law	  
of	  the	  world	  community	  nor	  the	  requirements	  of	  international	  law,	  a	  state	  that	  flouts	  the	  
law	   and	   scoffs	   at	   the	   constitutional	   state	   or	   state	   of	   law.”24	   This	   sort	   of	   definition	  
emphasizes	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  rogue	  state	  exists	  outside	  the	  community,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
obedience	  of	  the	  law	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  members	  of	  a	  given	  community,	  but	  inside	  the	  
law	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   obedience	   is	   nevertheless	   demanded	  of	   the	   rogue	   state.25	   In	   this	  
way,	   the	   rogue	   state	   is	   “at	   once	   included	   and	   excluded.”26	   	   The	   role	   played	   by	   law	   in	  
defining	  and	  dealing	  with	  rogue	  states	  introduces	  the	  idea	  of	  criminality	  into	  the	  picture.	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  as	  a	  criminal	  entity	  to	  be	  identified	  through	  the	  law	  and	  dealt	  
with	   using	   legal	   mechanisms	   had	   little	   currency	   for	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   previous	   Bush	  
regime.	  During	   last	  decade,	  the	  rogue	  state	  was	  treated	  as	  a	  purely	  external	  threat	  to	  be	  
neutralized.	   	  This	  was	  commensurate	  with	   that	  administration’s	  preference	   for	  unilateral	  
over	  multilateral	  action.	  	  The	  criminalization	  of	  the	  rogue	  state,	   it	   is	  argued,	  goes	  hand	  in	  
                                                                                                                
19	  Anthony	  Lake,	  Confronting	  Backlash	  States,	  73(2)	  FOREIGN	  AFFAIRS	  45,	  55	  (1994).	  	  	  
20	  Robert	  S.	  Litwak,	  Rogue	  States:	  A	  Handy	  Label	  but	  a	  Lousy	  Policy,	  THE	  WASHINGTON	  POST,	  (Feb.	  20,	  2000).	  	  	  
21	  LITWAK,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  75.	  
22	  Saunders,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  28;	  LITWAK,	  supra	  note	  15,	  at	  11.	  
23	  UN	  Charter	  art.	  2(7):	  “Nothing	  contained	  in	  the	  present	  Charter	  shall	  authorize	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  intervene	  
in	  matters	  which	  are	  essentially	  within	  the	  domestic	  jurisdiction	  of	  any	  state	  ….”	  
24	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  xiii.	  
25	  Id.	  at	  10-­‐14.	  
26	  Id.	  at	  21.	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hand	  with	  a	  multilateral	  approach	   to	   threats,	  whereby	   international	   law	  and	   institutions,	  
rather	   than	   national	   ones	   play	   the	   key	   role,	   and	   where	   community,	   rather	   than	  
individualism,	  underlies	  the	  policies.	  The	  present	  Obama	  administration	  has	  taken	  such	  an	  
approach.	  	  	  
	  
The	  movement	  towards	  community	  away	  from	  individualism	  suggests	  a	  parallel	  movement	  
away	   from	   sovereign	   equality	   and	   towards	   criminality.	   Criminals	   threaten	   a	   community	  
from	  within;	   criminal	   law	   is	   public	   law.	  Once	   the	  move	   is	  made	   to	   view	   rogue	   states	   as	  
criminals	  defined	  by	   their	   internal	   relationship	   to	   the	  community,	   it	   can	  be	  seen	   that	   far	  
from	  being	  a	  disruptive	  element,	  the	  rogue	  state	  can	  have	  quite	  the	  opposite	  effect;	  as	  the	  




C.	  	  Pursuing	  Collective	  Security	  through	  the	  Rogue	  State	  
	  
While	   not	   all	   measures	   used	   to	   counter	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   rogue	   states	   have	   been	  
multilateral,	  following	  Derrida,	  our	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  (SC).27	  The	  SC	  is	  
responsible	   for	  maintaining	  and	  restoring	   international	  peace	  and	  security.28	   It	   is	  capable	  
of	   imposing	  binding	  obligations	  on	  UN	  member	  states	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  Charter.29	  
In	  recent	  years,	   it	  has	  extended	  the	  sorts	  of	  obligations	   imposed	  on	  member	  states	   from	  
specific	  situations	  to	  general	   threats	  to	   international	  peace	  and	  security.30	  As	  part	  of	   this	  
change	  of	  tack,	  it	  has	  formulated	  counter-­‐proliferation	  and	  counter-­‐terrorism	  regimes,	  and	  
its	   activity	   has	   often	   been	   to	   hold	   non-­‐compliant	   states	   to	   account	   and	   to	   ensure	   their	  
future	  compliance.	  	  Its	  dealings	  with	  Iraq	  and	  with	  Iran	  and	  the	  pursuit	  and	  possession	  of	  
WMD	  demonstrate	  this	  strategy.	  
	  
The	   SC	   is	   comprised	   of	   15	   states:	   Five	   permanent	   members	   and	   10	   non-­‐permanent	  
members	  elected	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  Only	  the	  permanent	  members	  (China,	  France,	  
Russia,	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  US)	  have	  veto	  rights.31	  Nearly	  a	  decade	  ago,	  Derrida	  
                                            
27	  Id.	  at	  97.	  
28	   UN	   Charter	   art.	   24(1):	   “In	   order	   to	   ensure	   prompt	   and	   effective	   action	   by	   the	  United	  Nations,	   its	  Members	  
confer	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  primary	  responsibility	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  international	  peace	  and	  security,	  and	  
agree	  that	  in	  carrying	  out	  its	  duties	  under	  this	  responsibility	  the	  Security	  Council	  acts	  on	  their	  behalf.”	  
29	  UN	  Charter	  art.	  25:	   “The	  Members	  of	   the	  United	  Nations	  agree	   to	  accept	  and	  carry	  out	   the	  decisions	  of	   the	  
Security	  Council	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  present	  Charter.”	  
30	   Matthew	   Happold,	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   1373	   and	   the	   Constitution	   of	   the	   United	   Nations,	   16	   LEIDEN	  
JOURNAL	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (LJIL)	  593	  (2003).	  
31	  Article	  27(3)	  UN:	  “Decisions	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  on	  all	  other	  matters	  shall	  be	  made	  by	  an	  affirmative	  vote	  of	  
nine	   members	   including	   the	   concurring	   votes	   of	   the	   permanent	   members;	   provided	   that,	   in	   decisions	   under	  
Chapter	  VI,	  and	  under	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Article	  52,	  a	  party	  to	  a	  dispute	  shall	  abstain	  from	  voting.”	  
2012]	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complained	   that	   the	   wielding	   of	   power	   by	   the	   SC	   was	   “a	   monstrosity.”32	   However,	   the	  
privileged	  position	  of	   the	  Permanent	   Five	   (P5),	   to	  whose	  diktats	   Derrida	  objected,33	  was	  
the	   price	   paid	   for	   effective	   collective	   action.	   It	   has	   long	   been	   recognized	   that	   the	  
constitution	  of	  the	  Council	  “actually	  extended	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Great	  Powers.”34	  	  
	  
The	  presence	  of	  these	  unequal	  sovereigns	  in	  the	  SC	  renders	  the	  designation	  of	  rogue	  states	  
possible:	  in	  a	  system	  where	  sovereign	  equality	  was	  a	  reality,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  entity	  with	  
the	   standing	   to	   make	   the	   designation	   of	   rogue	   statehood.	   As	   Gerry	   Simpson	   explains,	  
“Great	  Powers	  often	   identify	  or	  define	   the	  norms	   that	  place	   certain	   states	   in	   a	   separate	  
normative	  universe.”35	  Anghie	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  “civilizing	  missions”	  that	  can	  then	  be	  
taken	   against	   such	   states	   are	   a	   manifestation	   of	   “imperial	   expansion.”36	   In	   the	   UN	  
collective	  security	  system,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  that	  the	  P5	  can	  guarantee	  the	  system	  with	  their	  
capacity	   to	  marshal	   the	  troops	  and	  resources	  to	  undertake	  Chapter	  VII	  action;	   they	  must	  
do	  this	  legitimately.	  Or,	  at	  least,	  they	  must	  not	  be	  seen	  to	  do	  so	  illegitimately.	  The	  threat	  to	  
the	  entire	  community	  posed	  by	  a	  rogue	  state	  eases	  the	  process	  of	  legitimation.	  
	  
	  
I.	  Unequal	  Sovereigns	  
	  
The	   concept	   of	   the	   rogue	   state	   is	   particularly	   associated	  with	   the	   US,	   “the	  world’s	   sole	  
superpower.”37	  The	  first	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  is	  said	  to	  have	  been	  in	  The	  Washington	  Post	  in	  
197338	   and	   it	   became	   entrenched	   in	   American	   political	   discourse	   when	   it	   was	   adopted	  
during	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration.39	  In	  2000,	  the	  Clinton	  Administration	  
attempted	  to	  drop	  the	  term,	  and	  a	  Department	  of	  State	  spokesman	  explained	  that	  “[t]his	  
is	  more	   a	   change	   in	   our	   description	   of	   things	   rather	   than	   a	   change	   in	  what	  we've	   been	  
                                            
32	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  98.	  
33	  Id.	  at	  99.	  
34	  Jamer	  Brierly,	  The	  Covenant	  and	  the	  Charter,	  23	  BRITISH	  YEARBOOK	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  (BYIL)	  83,	  91-­‐2	  (1946).	  
35	  SIMPSON,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  6.	  
36	  Antony	  Anghie,	  On	  Critique	  and	  Other,	  in	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  AND	  ITS	  OTHERS	  394	  (Anne	  Orford	  ed.,	  2006).	  
37	   Thomas	   M.	   Franck,	   The	   Power	   of	   Legitimacy	   and	   the	   Legitimacy	   of	   Power:	   International	   Law	   in	   an	   Age	   of	  
Disequilibrium	  100(1)	  AJIL	  88,	  97	  (2006).	  
38	   According	   to,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	   Online,	   available	   at:	  
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/166894?redirectedFrom=rogue%20state#eid25187963	   (last	   accessed:	   24	   April	  
2012).	  
39	  NATIONAL	  SECURITY	  COUNCIL	  OF	  USA,	  NATIONAL	  SECURITY	  STRATEGY	  (February	  1995).	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doing.”40	  Similarly,	   it	   could	  be	   that	  although	   the	   term	   rogue	  state	  has	  vanished	   from	  the	  
official	  publications	  of	  the	  Obama	  administration,41	  its	  spirit	  endures.	  
	  
On	  its	  face,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  in	  the	  US	  presents	  a	  fundamental	  change	  from	  the	  
Bush	   administration:	   it	   has	   committed	   itself	   to	   multilateralism	   and	   working	   through	  
international	   institutions	  and	  it	  has,	  to	  an	  extent,	  distanced	  itself	  from	  the	  use	  of	  force.42	  
However,	   their	   policies	   regarding	   collective	   security	   share	   a	   key	   tenet:	   Sovereign	  
inequality.	   In	  September	  2009,	  President	  Obama	  announced	  “a	  new	  era	  of	  engagement”	  
and	  “mutual	  respect.”	  He	  said	  that	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  all	  nations	  would	  require	  “[t]he	  
cooperative	   effort	   of	   the	   whole	   world.”43	   Such	   a	   position	   is	   by	   no	   means	   new:	   	   the	  
observation	   that	   it	   is	   a	   “small	   world”	   is	   a	   cliché.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   over	   ten	   years	   ago	   since	  
former	   UK	   Prime	   Minister,	   Tony	   Blair,	   gave	   his	   famous	   “doctrine	   of	   international	  
community”	  speech	  in	  which	  he	  observed	  that	  “[w]e	  are	  all	  internationalists	  now,	  whether	  
we	  like	  it	  or	  not.”44	  Similar	  sentiments	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  high-­‐profile	  UN	  
document	   concerning	   collective	   security,	   A	   More	   Secure	   World,	   Our	   Shared	  
Responsibility.45	  
	  
This	  philosophy	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  tackling	  threats	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  like	  
international	  terrorism	  and	  nuclear	  proliferation.	  Indeed,	  throughout	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  
SC	   engaged	   in	   projects	   that	   required	   blanket	   participation	   rather	   than	   donations	   from	   a	  
few	   able	   states.	   A	   good	   example	   of	   this	   is	   the	   Counter	   Terrorism	   Committee	   and	   its	  
monitoring	  work.46	  Other	  examples	   include	  the	  sanctions	  regimes	   leveled	  at	  North	  Korea	  
and	   Iran.	   At	   a	   recent	   address	   to	   the	   Security	   Council,	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Hilary	   Clinton	  
stressed	   the	   US’	   commitment	   to	   multilateral	   institutions	   and	   their	   importance	   in	   a	  
“comprehensive	  approach”	  to	  countering	  such	  threats.47	  
	  
Bearing	   this	   in	   mind,	   the	   participation	   and	   support	   of	   most,	   if	   not	   all	   states	   in	   security	  
initiatives	  concerns	  not	  only	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  action,	  but	  also	  its	  effectiveness.	  Garnering	  
                                            
40	   Richard	   Boucher,	   State	   Department	   Daily	   Press	   Briefing,	   Jun.	   19,	   2000,	   available	   at:	   http://1997-­‐
2001.state.gov/www/briefings/0006/000619db.html	  (last	  accessed:	  24	  April	  2012).	  
41	  US	  NSS	  2010,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  2.	  
42	  Id.	  at	  12-­‐13.	  
43	   Barack	   Obama,	   Responsibility	   for	   our	   Common	   Future,	   address	   to	   the	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   Meeting,	   64th	  
Session,	  Sept.	  23,	  2009.	  
44	  Tony	  Blair,	  Doctrine	  of	  the	  International	  Community,	  address	  to	  the	  Economic	  Club	  of	  Chicago,	  Apr.	  24,	  1999.	  
45	  HIGH-­‐LEVEL	  PANEL	  ON	  THREATS,	  CHALLENGES	  AND	  CHANGE,	  A	  MORE	  SECURE	  WORLD:	  OUR	  SHARED	  RESPONSIBILITY	  (2004).	  
46	  Established	  under	  UN	  Doc.	  S/Res/1373	  (2001).	  
47	  UN	  Doc.	  S/PV.6390,	  6390th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  (2010).	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support	  and	  cooperation	  often	   involves	   the	  creation	  of	   reasons	   to	  do	  so:	  one	  of	   these	   is	  
the	  rogue	  state.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  provides	  two	  sorts	  of	  reasons:	  one	  positive	  
and	  one	  negative.	  
	  
The	  positive	  role	  played	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  is	  that	  it	  indicates	  the	  magnitude	  
of	  the	  threat	  facing	  the	  international	  community	  and	  the	  necessity	  for	  taking	  action.	  This	  is	  
connected	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   rogue	   states	  are	  not	  only	  outside	   the	  community,	  but	   that	  
their	   identity	   lies	   in	   their	   hostility	   to	   the	   community.48	   Rogue	   states	   are	   presented	   as	   a	  
threat	  to	  the	  entire	  “international	  community,”	  and	  not	  just	  particular	  states	  within	  it.	  This	  
impression	  is	  aided	  by	  the	  eagerness	  of	  states	  to	  identify	  themselves	  with	  the	  purportedly	  
universal	  norms	  of	  liberal	  democracy.49	  	  
	  
In	  this	  way,	  rogue	  states	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  means	  of	  generating	  an	  external	  aspect	   for	  an	  
otherwise	   “all-­‐embracing”	   international	   community	  of	   states	   as	   a	  whole.50	   It	  means	   that	  
some	   states,	  prima	   facie	  members	   of	   the	   community	   by	   dint	   of	   their	   statehood,	   can	   be	  
excluded	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   their	   values	   or	   interests.	   This	   suggests	   an	   international	  
community	  that	  is	  not	  simply	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  “all	  states,”	  but	  a	  positive	  community	  
of	  interests	  and	  values.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  community	  may	  seem	  like	  “imperialism	  
in	  disguise”	  because	  “there	  is	  no	  agreement	  on	  the	  character	  of	  a	  desirable	  community.”51	  
	  
In	  close	  connection,	  the	  negative	  role	  played	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  relates	  to	  
the	  Otherness	   of	   rogue	   states.	   As	   Derrida	   explained,	   “[t]he	   voyou	   is	   always	   the	   other	   –	  
always	   designated	   in	   the	   second	   or	   third	   person.”52	   The	   rogue	   state	   is	   exceptional:	  
measures	  taken	  against	  such	  an	  aberration	  are	  not	  assumed	  to	  be	  applicable	  to	  the	  general	  
body	  of	  states.	  For	  instance,	  measures	  taken	  against	  Iran,	  such	  as	  the	  demand	  that	  it	  cease	  
enriching	  uranium,53	  are	  not	   leveled	  against	  other	  countries	  that	  have	  developed	  nuclear	  
fuel	   reactors	   such	   as	   Brazil	   –	   or	   even	   countries	   well	   known	   to	   have	   nuclear	   weapons	  
programs	   –	   such	   as	   India.	   This	   exceptionality	   means	   that	   states	   can	   support	   intrusive	  
                                            
48	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  64.	  
49	  For	  example,	  the	  Millennium	  Declaration,	  adopted	  unanimously	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  on	  8	  September	  2000,	  
listed	   the	   values	   of	   Freedom,	   Equality,	   Solidarity,	   Tolerance,	   Respect	   for	   Nature	   and	   Shared	   Responsibility	   as	  
fundamental	  values:	  see	  UN	  Doc.	  A/Res/55/2	  (2000).	  
50	  Bruno	  Simma	  &	  Andreas	  L.	  Paulus,	  The	   ‘International	  Community’:	  Facing	   the	  Challenge	  of	  Globalization	  9(2)	  
EJIL	  266,	  268	  (1998).	  
51	  MARTTI	  KOSKENNIEMI,	  FROM	  APOLOGY	  TO	  UTOPIA:	  THE	  STRUCTURE	  OF	  INTERNATIONAL	  LEGAL	  ARGUMENTATION	  (2005).	  
52	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  64.	  
53	  See	  for	  example,	  UN	  Doc.	  S/Res/1696	  (2006).	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measures	   that	  prima	   facie	   compromise	   sovereignty,54	  without	   fearing	   that	   this	  will	   set	   a	  
precedent	  that	  could	  one	  day	  be	  applied	  to	  their	  own	  activities.	  	  	  
	  
The	   view	   that	   some	   states,	   by	   virtue	  of	   their	   deviance,	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	   sovereign	  
protections	   expected	  by	  most	   states	   is	   also	   present	   in	   the	   literature.	   Professor	   Christian	  
Tomuschat	  has	  stated	  that	  “[a]	  system	  of	  government	  that	  has	  fallen	  so	  deeply	  into	  decay	  
deserves	  no	  protection	  against	  interference	  by	  the	  international	  community.”55	  While	  for	  a	  
normal	  state,	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  ““sovereignty”	  plays	  a	  role	  analogous	  to	  that	  played	  
by	  “liberty”	  in	  domestic	  liberal	  discourse,”56	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  rogue	  state,	  sovereignty	  is	  an	  
obstacle	  to	   justice	  or	  security.57	  This	   is	  because	  sovereignty	   insulates	  states	  whose	  norm-­‐
violating	  behavior	  would	  be	  termed	  deviant	  were	  they	  human	  individuals.58	  	  
	  
Bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  thick	  international	  community	  of	  values	  and	  interests,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  
see	  the	  concept	  of	  rogue	  state	  as	  promoting	  the	  unequal	  sovereignty	  of	  Great	  Powers	  on	  
the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin.	  The	  US	  has	  been	  the	  most	  energetic	  state	  in	  identifying	  rogues.	  
It	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  do	  so	  because	  of	  its	  self-­‐identification	  with	  values	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  
and	  the	  rule	  of	   law.	  The	  Obama	  administration,59	  no	   less	   than	  the	  Bush	  administration,60	  
identifies	  the	  US	  with	  human	  rights	  and	  democratic	  values.	  In	  both	  cases,	  these	  values	  are	  
presented	  as	  universal.61	   This	   seems	  commensurate	  with	  an	  observation	  of	   the	  historian	  
E.H.	   Carr.	   He	   wrote	   that	   “the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   harmony	   of	   interests	   ….	   is	   the	   natural	  
assumption	  of	  a	  prosperous	  and	  privileged	  class,	  whose	  members	  have	  a	  dominant	  voice	  in	  
the	  community	  and	  are	  therefore	  naturally	  prone	  to	  identify	  its	  interest	  with	  their	  own.”62	  
	  
Both	  positive	  and	  negative	  roles	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  rogue	  state	  –	  in	  persuading	  states	  that	  
action	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  and	  in	  quieting	  their	  fears	  that	  such	  action	  may	  have	  undesired	  
                                            
54	  UN	  Charter	  art.	  2(7).	  
55	  Christian	  Tomuschat,	  Obligations	  Arising	  for	  States	  Without	  of	  Against	  Their	  Will,	  241	  RECUEIL	  DES	  COURS	  194,	  342	  
(1993).	  
56	  KOSKENNIEMI,	  supra	  note	  52,	  at	  300.	  
57	  For	   the	   idea	   that	  actors	   that	  are	  excluded	  because	  of	   their	  deviance	  are	  not	   trusted	  with	   their	   freedom,	  see	  
Bauman,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  207.	  	  	  
58	  Id.	  at	  206.	  
59	  US	  NSS	  2010,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  35.	  
60	  US	  NSS	  2002,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  3.	  
61	  See	   for	  example,	  US	  NSS	  2010,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  5.	   	  For	  the	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush	  position,	  see	  NATIONAL	  SECURITY	  
COUNCIL	  OF	  USA,	  NATIONAL	  SECURITY	  STRATEGY	  (2006).	  
62	   EDWARD	  H.	   CARR,	   THE	   TWENTY	   YEARS’	   CRISIS	   1919-­‐1939:	   AN	   INTRODUCTION	   TO	   THE	   STUDY	   OF	   INTERNATIONAL	   RELATIONS	  
(1981).	  
2012]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   569 We	  Have	  Not	  Seen	  the	  Last	  of	  the	  Rogue	  State	  
consequences	   –	   are	   fed	   by	   a	   grammatical	   ambiguity	   in	   the	   term	   rogue	   state.	   Derrida	  
pointed	  out	  that	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  whether	  the	  word	  rogue	   is	  to	  be	  read	  as	  an	  adjective	  or	  a	  
noun.63	  If	  the	  word	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  noun	  together	  with	  the	  word	  state,	  the	  designation	  
rogue	   state	   appears	   to	   say	   that	   the	   state	   is	   substantially	   a	   rogue.	   If	   however,	   it	   is	   to	  be	  
taken	   as	   an	   adjective,	   then	   it	   seems	   merely	   to	   describe	   some	   temporary	   attribute	  
manifested	   in	  voyou	  behaviour.64	  The	  ambiguity	  of	   the	  phrase	  enables	   its	  users	   to	  evoke	  
the	  essential	  difference	  and	  dangerousness	  of	   rogue	  states,	  while	   simultaneously	   leaving	  




II.	  Intervention	  and	  Isolation	  
	  
The	   ambiguity	   of	   the	   rogue	   state	   –	   whether	   it	   is	   an	   essentially	   wicked	   entity	   or	  
contingently	  defined	  by	  certain	  policies	  or	  actions	  –	  relates	  to	  two	  methods	  of	  tackling	  the	  
threat	   it	  poses:	   	   Intervention	  and	  exclusion.66	  The	   thinking	  behind	  exclusion	   is	   “the	  hope	  
….is	   that	   a	   spell	   in	   the	  wilderness	  will	  make	   the	   pariah	   state	   come	   to	   its	   senses	   and	   re-­‐
enter	  international	  society	  as	  a	  reformed	  character.”67	  The	  thinking	  behind	  intervention	  is,	  
taken	   to	   its	   logical	  extent	  as	   it	  was	   in	   Iraq,	   regime	  change.	   It	   is	  possible	   to	  associate	   the	  
policy	  of	   intervention	  with	  the	  previous	  Bush	  administration	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  isolation	  with	  
the	  present	  Obama	  administration.68	  	  
	  
The	   ambiguity	   of	   the	   term	   rogue	   state	   makes	   it	   seem	   possible	   that	   rogue	   states	   are	  
capable	   of	   being	   reformed,	   of	   shedding	   the	   stigmatic	   qualifying	   adjective.	   At	   the	   same	  
time,	  it	  enables	  other	  states	  to	  glide	  over	  the	  conceptual	  difficulty	  of	  reforming	  a	  sovereign	  
state	   because	   of	   the	   essential	   difference	   of	   rogue	   states	   from	   the	   rest.	   The	   tactics	   of	  
exclusion	  share	  a	  conceptual	  basis	  of	  sovereign	  inequality	  with	  the	  tactics	  of	  intervention.	  	  
In	   this	   way,	   we	  might	   suppose	   that	   Obama’s	   emphasis	   on	   isolation	   is	   not	   diametrically	  
opposed	  to	  his	  predecessor’s	  penchant	  for	  regime	  change.	  
	  
                                            
63	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  79-­‐80.	  
64	  Id.	  at	  79-­‐80.	  
65	   It	   is	  thought	  that	  the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  adoption	  of	  “states	  of	  concern”	  rather	  than	  rogue	  states	  was	  a	  
response	  to	  their	  negotiating	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Democratic	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Korea.	  
66	  SIMPSON,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  285.	  
67	  Id.	  at	  284.	  
68	   Isolation,	   in	  the	  guise	  of	  containment	  was	  also	  used	  by	  the	  Clinton	  administration;	  See,	  for	  example,	  National	  
Security	  Council	  of	  USA,	  National	  Security	  Strategy,	  December	  2000;	  US	  NSS	  1995,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  2.	  
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  13	  No.	  05 570 Ge rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
Intensifying	  this	  is	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  tactics	  of	  exclusion	  and	  intervention	  can	  be	  seen	  
on	  a	  continuum.	  The	  structure	  of	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  suggests	  that	  exclusion	  of	  a	  
state	   from	  the	  “international	   community”	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  precursor	   to	   its	   intervention.	  
This	  is	  mirrored	  by	  the	  progression	  through	  article	  41	  to	  article	  42	  in	  Chapter	  VII.	  Although	  
the	  sanctions	  envisaged	  in	  article	  41	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  interventions	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  of	  
a	   sovereign	   state	   in	   a	   broad	   sense,	   they	   are	   “measures	   not	   involving	   the	   use	   of	   armed	  
force.”69	   Article	   42	  measures	  may	   be	   taken	   “[s]hould	   the	   Security	   Council	   consider	   that	  
measures	   provided	   for	   in	   Article	   41	   would	   be	   inadequate	   or	   have	   proved	   to	   be	  
inadequate….”70	   Article	   42	  measures	   are	   seen	   as	   “exceptional;”	   to	   be	   used	   only	   in	   case	  
measures	  not	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  are	  ineffective.71	  
	  
The	  Obama	  administration	  has	  been	  using	   the	   tactic	  of	   isolation	   in	   the	  cases	  of	   Iran	  and	  
North	  Korea:	  	  progressively	  tougher	  sanctions	  are	  leveled	  at	  these	  states	  as	  their	  failure	  to	  
comply	  with	  the	  SC	  obligations	  continues.	  For	  instance,	  the	  administration’s	  policy	  towards	  
Iran	   centers	   around	   the	   integration	   or	   exclusion	   of	   that	   state	   in	   international	   society:	  
Obama	  has	  said	  that	  “[w]e	  want	  Iran	  to	  take	  its	  rightful	  place	  in	  the	  community	  of	  nations,	  
politically	  and	  economically	  ….	   [O]r	   the	  government	  can	  choose	   increased	   isolation	   [and]	  
international	   pressure….”72	   In	   this	   sense	   there	   has	   been	   little	   change	   from	   the	   Bush	  
administration’s	  use	  of	  sanctions	  to	  enforce	  compliance.	  The	  “suspension-­‐for-­‐suspension”	  
understanding	  –	  that	  sanctions	  will	  be	  suspended	  as	  soon	  as	  Iran	  suspends	  its	  proscribed	  
activities	   –	   persists.73	   Furthermore,	   both	   administrations	   refused	   to	   rule	   out	   ultimately	  
resorting	  to	  force.74	  	  
	  
The	  difference	   lies	   in	   the	  present	  administration’s	  willingness	   to	   “engage”	  with	   Iran.	  The	  
so-­‐called	  E3+3	  (China,	  France,	  Germany,	  Russia,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US)	  have	  adopted	  a	  “dual-­‐
tract”	   approach	   that	   consists	   of	   sanctions	   and	   dialogue.	   Obama’s	   prominent	   policy	   of	  
“engagement”	  is	  one	  that	  promises	  to	  bring	  recalcitrant	  states,	  isolated	  from	  international	  
                                            
69	  UN	  Charter	  art.	  41.	  
70	  UN	  Charter	  art.	  42.	  
71	  Jochin	  Frowein	  &	  Nico	  Krisch,	  Article	  42,	  in	  THE	  CHARTER	  OF	  THE	  UNITED	  NATIONS:	  A	  COMMENTARY	  753	  (Bruno	  Simma	  
ed.,	  2002).	  
72	   Barack	   Obama,	   Hradcany	   Square,	   Prague,,	   Apr.5	   2009,	   available	   at:	  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-­‐By-­‐President-­‐Barack-­‐Obama-­‐In-­‐Prague-­‐As-­‐Delivered/	  
(last	  accessed:	  24	  April	  2012).	  	  
73	  The	  UK’s	  permanent	  representative	  at	  the	  Security	  Council,	  Sir	  Mark	  Lyall	  Grant,	  expressed	  this	  rationale	  in	  the	  
Security	  Council	  meeting	  at	  which	  SCR	  1929	  (2010)	  was	  passed;	  see	  UN	  Doc.	  S/PV.6335	  (2010).	  
74	  US	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  Admiral	  Mike	  Mullen	  has	  not	  only	  said	  that	  military	  actions	  remain	  on	  the	  table,	  but	  also	  that	  
the	  military	  has	  already	  made	  “a	  plan”;	  see	  transcript	  from	  “Meet	  the	  Press,”	  MSNBC,	  Aug.	  1,	  2010,	  available	  at:	  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38487969/	  (last	  accessed:	  24	  April	  2012).	  	  
2012]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   571 We	  Have	  Not	  Seen	  the	  Last	  of	  the	  Rogue	  State	  
society,	  back	  into	  the	  fold.75	  The	  idea	  that	  it	  may	  be	  worth	  engaging	  with	  rogue	  states	  also	  
points	  to	  the	  view	  of	  them	  as	  quasi-­‐criminal	  entities	  defined	  according	  to	  their	  violation	  of	  
norms	  of	  order.	  As	  Bauman	  has	  explained,	  “[t]he	  very	  ideas	  of	  order	  and	  norm	  are	  born	  of	  
that	  sense	  of	  (rectifiable)	  imperfection.”76	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  current	  US	  National	  Security	  Strategy,	  states	  are	  isolated	  when	  they	  fail	  to	  
meet	  their	  international	  responsibilities:	  
	  
Those	  nations	  that	  refuse	  to	  meet	  their	  responsibilities	  
will	   forsake	   the	   opportunities	   that	   come	   with	  
international	   cooperation.	   Credible	   and	   effective	  
alternatives	   to	   military	   action—from	   sanctions	   to	  
isolation—must	  be	  strong	  enough	   to	  change	  behavior,	  
just	  as	  we	  must	  reinforce	  our	  alliances	  and	  our	  military	  
capabilities.	   And	   if	   nations	   challenge	  or	   undermine	   an	  
international	   order	   that	   is	   based	   upon	   rights	   and	  
responsibilities,	  they	  must	  find	  themselves	  isolated	  77	  
	  
However,	   the	   consequences	   that	   flow	   from	   failure	   to	  meet	   international	   responsibilities	  
depend	  on	   the	   status	  of	   the	   state	   concerned.78	   It	   seems,	   then,	   that	  only	   certain	   sorts	  of	  
states	   are	   isolated.	   The	   states	   that	   are	   isolated	   are	   those	  whose	   failure	   to	   comply	  with	  
international	   responsibilities	  appears	   to	   render	   them	  a	   threat	   to	   international	  peace	  and	  
security.	  It	  could	  be	  said	  that	  the	  fact	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  as	  a	  measurable	  and	  visible	  event	  
manifests	  what	  is	  otherwise	  an	  uncertain	  and	  unformed	  threat	  to	  peace	  and	  security.79	  The	  
very	  isolation	  of	  states	  in	  this	  way	  renders	  them	  “rogue”	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  rogue	  state	  is	  
one	  placed	  temporarily	  or	  constitutionally	  outside	  international	  society.80	  
	  
This	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   rogue	   statehood	   leads	   us	   back	   to	   Derrida’s	  
understanding	  of	  the	  term	  as	  relating	  to	  the	  rejection	  of	  international	  law.81	  In	  the	  context	  
                                            
75	  US	  NSS	  2010,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  11-­‐12.	  
76	  Bauman,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  206.	  
77	  US	  NSS	  2010,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  12.	  	  	  
78	  See,	  for	  example,	  ANTONIO	  CASSESE,	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  IN	  A	  DIVIDED	  WORLD	  (1986).	  
79	   Isobel	   Roele,	   Ascertaining	   Inchoate	   Threats	   to	   International	   Peace	   and	   Security,	   in	   INTERNATIONAL	   LAW	   IN	   A	  
MULTIPOLAR	  WORLD	  (Mathew	  Happold	  ed.,	  2011).	  
80	   Interestingly	   the	   Oxford	   English	   Dictionary	   online	   edition	   suggests	   that	   the	   word	   ‘rogue’	   originally	   meant	  
vagrant	  or	  vagabond.	  	  These	  individuals	  wandered	  across	  the	  country	  rather	  than	  being	  included	  in	  any	  particular	  
society;	  see	  generally,	  THE	  OXFORD	  ENGLISH	  DICTIONARY,	  available	  at:	  http://www.oed.com/	  (last	  accessed:	  24	  April	  
2012).	  
81	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2.	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of	  domestic	  criminal	  law,	  Zygmunt	  Bauman	  has	  written	  about	  how	  the	  pursuit	  of	  order	  in	  
societies	   characterized	   by	   uncertainty	   and	   insecurity	   invites	   a	   paradigm	   of	   exclusion.82	  
Those	  who	  do	  not	  fit	   into	  the	  dominant	  order	  are	  abnormal	  because	  they	  do	  not	  comply	  
with	   society’s	   norms.	  At	   the	   extreme	   reaches	   of	   abnormality	   is	   deviance.83	   Rogue	   states	  
are	  deviant	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  	  
	  
The	   rogue	   state	   is	   identified	   not	   by	   a	   particular	   manifestation	   of	   violence,	   but	   by	   its	  
attitude	   to	   international	   society	   as	   demonstrated	   through	   its	   compliance	   with	  
international	  legal	  obligations.	  In	  Iran’s	  case,	  such	  compliance	  was	  presented,	  both	  by	  the	  
International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency84	  and	  by	  the	  SC,85	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  confidence	  building.	  
Lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  Iran	  flowed	  from	  its	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  “community”	  obligations,	  
which	   in	   turn	  could	  only	  be	   rectified	  by	  compliance.	  This	   seems	  borne	  out	  by	   the	   stated	  
purpose	  of	   the	  US	  and	   its	  allies	   to	  use	   the	   tactics	  of	   isolation	   to	  encourage	   Iran	   to	  come	  
back	  into	  the	  fold.86	  The	  US	  policy	  is	  echoed	  in	  Bauman’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  
norms:	  norms	   translate	   “the	   concept	  of	  order	   into	   the	   language	  of	  human	   choices.”87	   In	  
this	   respect,	   a	   state	   like	   Iran	  or	  North	  Korea	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  excluded	  by	  dint	  of	   its	  own	  
choices,88	  and	  consequently	  capable	  of	  choosing	  to	  be	  reintegrated.	  
	  
It	  is	  worth	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  linkage	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  threat	  and	  responsibility	  is	  not	  
limited	   to	   the	  US	  and	   its	   allies.	   The	  UN	  has	   also	  adopted	   the	   rhetoric	  of	   responsibility.89	  
This	  echoing	  of	  strategy	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  the	  controversial	  issue	  of	  state	  
crime:	  we	   can	   understand	   the	   tactic	   of	   isolation	   by	   analogy	   to	   the	   human	   equivalent	   of	  
imprisonment.	   In	   withdrawing	   international	   commerce	   and	   diplomatic	   relations,	   states	  
implementing	  the	  sanctions	  called	  for	  the	  by	  SC	  are	  essentially	  cutting	  states	  like	  Iran	  and	  






                                            
82	  Bauman,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  207.	  
83	  Id.	  at	  206.	  
84	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  Doc.	  GOV/2006/14	  (2006).	  
85	  UN	  Doc.	  S/Res.1696	  (2006).	  
86	  Bauman,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  206.	  
87	  Id.	  at	  206.	  
88	  Id.	  at	  207.	  
89	  Report	  of	  the	  High-­‐Level	  Panel	  on	  Threats,	  Challenges	  and	  Change,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  17.	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III.	  Criminal	  States?	  
	  
Derrida	  said	  that	  the	  term	  voyou	  always	  “begins	  to	  justify	  some	  sanction.”90It	  could	  be	  said	  
that	   the	  designation	  of	  a	   state	  as	  a	   rogue	  state	  acts	   in	  place	  of	   the	  criminal	   justice	   label	  
guilty.	   This	   goes	   further	   than	  Derrida	  who	   said	   that	   “[w]hen	   speaking	  of	   a	  voyou,	   one	   is	  
calling	   to	  order;	   one	  has	  begun	   to	  denounce	  a	   suspect.”91	  The	   suggestion	   is	   not	   an	  easy	  
one.	   	  However,	   the	   controversy	  of	   the	   idea	  of	   state	   criminality	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   an	  
important	   legitimizing	   role	   to	   be	   played	   by	   the	   rogue	   state.92	   This	   section	   sets	   out	   the	  
preliminary	  ground	  for	  linking	  the	  concepts	  of	  rogue	  statehood	  and	  criminality.	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  only	  aspect	  of	  criminal	  responsibility	  of	  states	  that	  is	  not	  controversial	  is	  that	  
the	  notion	  is	  controversial.	  There	  are	  practical	  objections	  to	  state	  criminality:	  	  For	  instance,	  
it	   may	   encourage	   states	   to	   become	   self-­‐appointed	   policemen	   of	   the	   international	  
community.93	  There	  are	  also	  conceptual	  objections:	   	  States	  are	  abstract	  entities	  with	  “no	  
soul	   to	   damn	   and	   no	   body	   to	   kick.”94	   In	   this	   vein,	   the	   Nuremberg	   International	  Military	  
Tribunal	   (IMT)	   stated	   that	   “crimes	   against	   international	   law	   are	   committed	   by	  men,	   not	  
abstract	  entities.”95	  	  
	  
However,	  there	  has	  been	  sufficient	  discussion	  of	  the	   issue	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  
state	  crime	   is	  worth	  considering.	  For	   instance,	   the	   International	  Court	  of	   Justice	   (ICJ)	  has	  
thrown	   doubt	   on	   whether	   the	   IMT	   dictum	   rules	   out	   the	   possibility	   of	   state	   crime	  
altogether.	  In	  the	  Bosnia	  Genocide	  case,	  it	  suggested	  that	  the	  statement	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  IMT’s	  refutation	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  only	  states	  could	  be	  responsible	  
under	   international	   law.96	   Ultimately,	   however,	   the	   ICJ	   shied	   away	   from	   recognizing	   the	  
obligations	   in	   the	   Genocide	   Convention	   as	   state	   crimes.97	   The	   catalyst	   for	   the	   most	  
concerted	  discussion	  of	  state	  crime	  was	  article	  19	  of	   the	   International	  Law	  Commission’s	  
(ILC)	   draft	   on	   state	   responsibility.	   While,	   ultimately,	   all	   references	   to	   state	   crime	   were	  
                                            
90	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  79.	  
91	  Id.	  at	  64.	  
92	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  64.	  
93	  UN	  Doc.	  A/53/10	   (1998);	   International	   Law	  Commission,	   Report	   of	   the	   International	   Law	  Commission	  on	   the	  
work	  of	  its	  fiftieth	  session	  (1998).	  
94	  Phrase	  attributed	  to	  eighteenth	  century	  Lord	  Chancellor	  of	  Great	  Britain,	  First	  Baron	  Thurlow;	  See,	  for	  example,	  
John	   Coffee,	   ‘No	   Soul	   to	  Damn	   and	  No	   Body	   to	   Kick’:	   An	  Unscandalized	   Inquiry	   into	   the	   Problem	  of	   Corporate	  
Punishment	  	  79(3)	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  386	  (1980-­‐1).	  	  	  
95	  Nuremberg	  International	  Military	  Tribunal,	  Judgment	  and	  Sentences,	  41(1)	  AJIL	  172,	  221	  (1947).	  
96	  Application	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide	  (BIH	  v.	  SRB),	  2007	  
I.C.J.	  43,	  at	  172	  (Feb.	  26,	  2007).	  
97	  Id.	  at	  170.	  
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  13	  No.	  05 574 Ge rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
lifted	  from	  the	  Articles	  on	  State	  Responsibility	  that	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  
the	  issue	  was	  debatable	  enough	  to	  merit	  serious	  consideration.98	  In	  1976,	  the	  ILC	  agreed	  to	  
a	  definition	  of	  international	  crime.	  	  Draft	  article	  19(2)	  read	  
	  
An	   internationally	  wrongful	  act	  which	   results	   from	  the	  
breach	   by	   a	   State	   of	   an	   international	   obligation	   so	  
essential	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  interests	  of	  
the	   international	   community	   that	   its	   breach	   is	  
recognized	   as	   a	   crime	   by	   that	   community	   as	   a	  whole,	  
constitutes	  an	  international	  crime.99	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  paragraph,	  the	  ILC	  even	  gave	  some	  explanatory	  examples	  of	  international	  
crimes.	  Draft	  article	  19(3)(a)	  read	  
	  
3.	  	  Subject	  to	  paragraph	  2,	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  rules	  
of	   international	   law	   in	   force,	   an	   international	   crime	  
may	  result,	  inter	  alia,	  from:	  
(a)	   a	   serious	   breach	   of	   an	   international	   obligation	   of	  
essential	   importance	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	  
international	   peace	   and	   security,	   such	   as	   that	  
prohibiting	  aggression.100	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  state	  crime	   is	  entwined	  with	  the	   idea	  of	   international	  community,	  which	   is	  
also	  related	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  as	  a	  means	  of	  defining	  the	  community.101	  Crimes	  
are	  committed	  against	  a	  community	  as	  a	  whole,	  even	  where	  only	  one	  actor	  has	  suffered	  
direct	  harm.102	  In	  national	  legal	  systems,	  this	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  prosecution	  
represents,	  for	  instance,	  Regina	  in	  the	  UK	  or	  the	  People	  in	  the	  US.103	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  
SC	   purports	   to	   act	   on	   behalf	   of	   all	   UN	   member	   states104	   and	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   these	  
                                            
98	   UN	   Doc.	   A/53/10	   (1998);	   International	   Law	   Commission,	   supra	   note	   95;	   Official	   Records	   of	   the	   General	  
Assembly,	  Fifty-­‐third	  session,	  Supplement	  No.10,	  at	  64-­‐77.	  
99	   UN	   Doc.	   A/31/10	   (1976);	   INTERNATIONAL	   LAW	   COMMISSION,	   REPORT	   OF	   THE	   INTERNATIONAL	   LAW	   COMMISSION	   ON	   THE	  
WORK	   OF	   ITS	   TWENTY-­‐EIGHTH	   SESSION	   (1976);	   Official	   Records	   of	   the	   General	   Assembly,	   Thirty-­‐first	   session,	  
Supplement	  No.	  10,	  at	  95-­‐96.	  
100	  Id.	  at	  95-­‐96.	  
101	  DERRIDA,	  supra	  note	  2.	  
102	   The	  ways	   in	  which	   crime	   can	  be	  understood	   as	   a	   public	  matter	   are	   interestingly	   considered	  by	  G.	   Lamond,	  
What	  is	  a	  Crime?,	  27(4)	  OJLS	  609,	  614	  (2007).	  
103	  Sandra	  E.	  Marshall	  and	  Antony	  Duff,	  Criminalization	  and	  Sharing	  Wrongs,	  11(1)	  CAN.	  J.	  L	  &	  JURIS.	  7,	  15	  (1998).	  
104	  UN	  Charter	  art.	  24(1).	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member	  states	  constitute	  an	  international	  community,	  the	  SC	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  play	  a	  similar	  
role.	  
	  
Crimes	   are	   breaches	   of	   certain	   obligations	   owed	   to	   the	   community	   as	   a	   whole.105	   The	  
notion	  of	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  was	  set	  out	  by	  the	  ICJ	  in	  the	  Barcelona	  Traction	  case:	  	  “By	  
their	  very	  nature	  [they]	  are	  the	  concern	  of	  all	  States.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  rights	  
involved,	  all	  States	  can	  be	  held	  to	  have	  a	  legal	  interest	  in	  their	  protection.”106	  The	  concept	  
of	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  marked	  a	  fundamental	  departure	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  international	  
law	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  bilateral	  agreements	  and	  was	  viewed	  by	  some	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  
evolution	   of	   international	   law	   as	   global	   community	   law.107	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   notion	   of	  
state	  crime	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  extension	  of	   the	   idea	  of	  obligations	  erga	  omnes.108	  To	   the	  
extent	  that	  state	  crime	  involves	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  state	  being	  responsible	  to	  the	   international	  
community	   rather	   than	   to	   the	  specific	   injured	  state,	   it	   can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  manifestation	  of	  
unequal	   sovereignty.	  This	   is	   sharpened	  when	  the	  specific	  area	  of	   responsibility	   relates	   to	  
peace	   and	   security,	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   community-­‐wide	   importance.	   The	   fact	   that	  
decisions	  about	  peace	  and	  security	  are	  the	  province	  of	  the	  SC	  and	  that	  they	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  
made	  on	  behalf	  of	  UN	  member	  states	  also	  supports	  this	  reading.109	  
	  
This	  impression	  is	  intensified	  if	  one	  subscribes	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  enforcement	  of	  criminal	  
law	   implies	   a	   vertical	   system	   of	   authority.	   In	   other	   words,	   that	   the	   identification	   and	  
application	   of	   such	   laws	   requires	   a	   higher	   authority	   to	   represent	   the	   “international	  
community.”	   The	   frequency	   with	   which	   the	   UN	   and	   its	   Charter	   are	   identified	   with	   the	  
“international	   community”110	   suggest	   that	   the	   SC	   is	   a	   prime	   candidate	   to	   act	   as	   such	   an	  
authority.111	   This	   is	   also	   suggested	   by	   claims	   that	   SC	   resolutions	   express	   the	   “will	   of	   the	  
international	   community”	   and	   that	   their	   enforcement	   is	   the	   enforcement	   of	   that	  will.112	  
                                            
105	  Many	  commentators	  writing	  on	  state	  crime	  are	  careful	  to	  note	  that	  not	  all	  breaches	  of	  obligations	  erga	  omnes	  
could	   be	   considered	   criminal;	   see,	   for	   example,	  Geoff	  Gilbert,	  The	   Criminal	   Responsibility	   of	   States,	   39(2)	   ICLQ	  
345,	  355	  (1990);	  James	  Crawford,	  First	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  UN	  Doc.	  A/53/10	  (1998)	  69,	  at	  278-­‐279.	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  and	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  Company,	  Limited	  (NV	  v.	  ES)	  (New	  Application:	  1962),	  Second	  Phase,	  ICJ	  
Reports,	  (Feb.	  5,	  1970),	  at	  para.	  	  33.	  
107	   UN	   Doc.	   A/53/10	   (1998);	   International	   Law	   Commission,	   supra	   note	   95;	   Official	   Records	   of	   the	   General	  
Assembly,	  Fifty-­‐third	  session,	  Supplement	  No.10,	  67	  at	  265.	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  Bruno	  Simma,	  From	  Bilateralism	  to	  Community	  Interest,	  250	  RECUEIL	  DES	  COURS	  217,	  306	  (1994	  VI).	  
109	  Happold,	  supra	  note	  31.	  
110	  BARDO	  FASSBENDER,	  THE	  UNITED	  NATIONS	  CHARTER	  AS	  THE	  CONSTITUTION	  OF	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  COMMUNITY	  (2009);	  Nigel	  
White,	   The	   Legality	   of	   Bombing	   in	   the	   Name	   of	   Humanity	   5(1)	   JCSL	   27,	   28-­‐29	   (2000);	   Christian	   Tomuschat,	  
Obligations	  Arising	  for	  States	  Without	  of	  Against	  Their	  Will,	  241	  RECUEIL	  DES	  COURS	  194,	  334	  (1993	  IV).	  
111	  And	  within	  the	  SC,	  the	  P5;	  HIGH-­‐LEVEL	  PANEL	  ON	  THREATS,	  CHALLENGES	  AND	  CHANGE,	  supra	  note	  46.	  
112	  See,	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  example,	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  in	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Indeed,	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  state	  crime	  in	  his	  Hague	  Academy	  Lectures,	  Judge	  Bruno	  Simma	  
suggested	   “the	   principal	   sedes	   materiae	   of	   such	   organized	   collective	   enforcement	   [the	  
reaction	  to	  international	  crimes]	  will	  be	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter.”113	  
	  
The	  overlap	  of	  state	  crime	  and	  threats	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  is	  apparent	  from	  
the	  presence	  of	   aggression	   in	   article	   39.	   The	   IMT	  at	  Nuremberg	   labeled	   it	   the	   “supreme	  
international	  crime.”114	  It	  has	  been	  said	  “aggression	  is	  necessarily	  a	  crime	  of	  the	  state.”115	  
However,	   leaving	   aside	   the	   question	   of	   who	   is	   prosecuted	   for	   its	   commission,	   the	   dual	  
identity	  of	  aggression	  as	  both	  a	  crime	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  international	  peace	  and	  security	  was	  
recognized	   in	   the	   2011	   Review	   Conference	   on	   the	   Rome	   Statute	   that	   took	   place	   in	  
Kampala.	  The	  newly	  negotiated	  definition	  of	  aggression	  expressly	  connects	  the	  two	  uses	  of	  
the	  term	  by	  apparently	  suggesting	  that	  the	  ICC	  prosecutor	  should	  consider	  whether	  the	  SC	  
has	  made	  a	  finding	  of	  aggression	  before	  he	  proceeds	  with	  such	  a	  prosecution.116	  	  
	  
In	  practice	  the	  SC	  has	  not	  made	  findings	  of	  aggression	  under	  article	  39.117	  Its	  practice	  has	  
been	   to	   simply	   find	   a	   threat	   to	   international	   peace	   and	   security	   in	   order	   for	   Chapter	  VII	  
measures	   to	   be	   taken.	   Neither	   Iran	   nor	   North	   Korea,	   for	   instance,	   has	   been	   labeled	   an	  
aggressor	  in	  any	  SC	  resolutions.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  seems	  that	  when	  a	  state	  is	  labeled	  a	  rogue	  
state	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  has	  demonstrated	  its	  unwillingness	  to	  uphold	  its	  international	  
responsibilities	  by	   complying	  with	   its	  obligations,118	   there	   is	  a	   clear	  parallel	  with	  criminal	  
law.	  	  Sanctions	  are	  a	  sort	  of	  punishment	  –	  albeit	  one	  with	  a	  rehabilitative	  aim	  rather	  than	  a	  
retributive	  one	  –	  imposed	  for	  breach	  of	  obligations	  owed	  to	  the	  international	  community	  
as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
Sanctions	   regimes	   isolate	   the	   target	   state.	   This	   isolation	   is	   both	   material,	   for	   instance,	  
insofar	   as	   other	   states	   may	   not	   trade	   with	   them,	   and	   notional,	   for	   instance,	   insofar	   as	  
there	   is	   a	   stigma	  attached	   to	  being	  on	   the	   receiving	  end	  of	   SC	   sanctions.	   The	  process	  of	  
isolating	   a	   state	   by	   subjecting	   it	   to	   sanctions	   places	   it	   beyond	   the	   community,	   but	   not	  
beyond	  the	  law.	  Although	  a	  rogue	  state’s	  sovereign	  equality	  is	  undermined,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  
is	   subject	   to	   law	   is	  underscored.	   In	   this	   sense,	   isolation	   is	  not	  unlike	   imprisonment:	  both	  
are	  means	  of	  effectively	  stymieing	  freedom	  and	  of	  “estranging”	  an	  unstable	  element	  from	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  Have	  Not	  Seen	  the	  Last	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  the	  Rogue	  State	  
society.119	   Similarly,	   Simpson	   has	   referred	   to	   “a	   quasi-­‐penal	   regime	   of	   responsibility	   and	  
constraint”	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  treatment	  of	  rogue	  states.120	  
	  
This	  can	  be	  tied	  into	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  rogue	  state	  as	  a	  state	  that	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  
existing	   order	   and	   that	   seeks	   to	   disrupt	   it.	   As	   indicated	   above,121	   this	   opposition	   is	  
demonstrated	   by	   a	   state’s	   failure	   to	   comply	   with	   expressions	   of	   the	   “will	   of	   the	  
international	  community”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  legal	  obligations	  imposed	  by	  the	  Security	  Council.	  
In	   Obama’s	   National	   Security	   Strategy,	   this	   translates	   into	   an	   overall	   emphasis	   on	  
“responsibility.”	   In	  a	  world	  of	   connected	  security	   threats	   that	  can	  only	  be	   tackled	  by	   the	  
concerted	   closing	   of	   illicit	   supply	   routes,	   monitoring	   of	   borders	   and	   general	  
implementation	   of	   best	   practice	   models	   domestically,	   any	   state	   that	   fails	   in	   these	  
responsibilities	   contributes	   to	   disparate	   and	  undefined	   threats	   of	   international	   terrorism	  
and	  WMD	  proliferation.	  
	  
	  
D.	  	  Conclusion	  
	  
This	  paper	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  rogue	  state,	  though	  apparently	  absent	  from	  
US	   security	   documents,	   is	   implicit	   in	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Obama	   administration.	   This	   is	  
reflected	  by	  the	  resurfacing	  of	  the	  phrase	  “rogue	  regime”	  in	  speeches	  by	  the	  Secretaries	  of	  
State122	  and	  Defense123	  and	  even	  by	  the	  President	  himself.124	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  
concept	   of	   the	   rogue	   state,	   as	   a	   breed	   of	   “unequal	   sovereign”	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	  
international	  peace	  and	  security,	  is	  too	  useful	  to	  be	  jettisoned	  completely.	  It	  represents	  an	  
‘Other’	   that	   justifies	   the	   criminalization	   of	   certain	   states.	   Far	   from	   having	   disruptive	  
effects,	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  rogue	  state	  can	  promote	  a	  sense	  of	   international	  community,	  
can	  smooth	  the	  way	  for	  collective	  security	  action	  and	  can	  avoid	  the	  appearance	  of	  conflict	  
between	  fundamental	  principles.	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If	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  from	  the	  current	  US	  administration’s	  security	  documents	  
was	   intended	  to	  signal	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  machismo	  of	  the	  Bush	  Doctrine,	   it	  has	  not	  
signaled	   a	  move	   away	   from	  policy	   based	   on	   the	   inequality	   of	   sovereign	   states.	  Obama’s	  
foreign	  policy	  is	  based	  on	  sovereign	  responsibility	  and	  failures	  in	  such	  responsibility	  are	  to	  
be	   tackled	   with	   isolation	   and	   engagement.	   These	   dual	   measures	   may	   take	   the	   form	   of	  
sanctions	  and	  dialogue,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  and	  are	  related	  to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  target	  
state	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  “international	  community.”	  
	  
The	   necessity	   of	   gaining	   the	   support	   and	   cooperation	   of	   other	   states	   for	   the	  
implementation	  of	  wide-­‐ranging	  measures	  to	  prevent	  and	  suppress	  genres	  of	  threat	  such	  
as	  international	  terrorism	  or	  the	  proliferation	  of	  WMD	  rests	  on	  the	  accepted	  inequality	  of	  
the	  rogue	  state.	  This	  acceptance	  hinges	  on	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  rogue	  state	  as	  dangerous	  
or	   deviant.	   Such	   a	   perception	   can	   segue	   into	   a	   view	   of	   rogue	   states	   as	   criminal	   states	  
insofar	   as	   it	   flows	   from	   their	   failure	   to	   live	   up	   to	   the	   responsibilities	   they	   owe	   to	   the	  
“international	   community.”	   The	   isolation	   of	   such	   states	   seems	   to	   correspond	   to	   the	  
exclusion	   practiced	   in	   domestic	   criminal	   regimes.	   This	   ties	   in	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   rogue	  
state	   as	   a	   state	   defined	   by	   its	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   norms	   of	   order:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  
suggesting	  the	  possibility	  of	  redemption	  through	  conformity,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  the	  threat	  
of	  disorder. 
 
